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In an earlier column, I commented about recent developments in paternity law that left Maryland children
unprotected.In Langston v. Riffe (2000) and Walter v. Gunter (2002) the Court of Appeals held that legal fathers
seeking to disestablish paternity can 1) have genetic testing on demand (unless he knew he was not the biological
father when consenting to paternity; 2) have paternity disestablished if genetic tests exclude him; and 3) have all
back child support forgiven.The state’s highest court made clear that consideration of the “best interests of the
child” has no role in these decisions. While not alone in this approach, this reading of Maryland’s paternity laws
undermines child support enforcement, destabilizes families and, most importantly, harms children.Now comes the
next installment in this branch of the law, the Court of Special Appeals (CSA) 2004 decision in Stubbs v. Colandrea.
While offering greater protection for children of married parents, Stubbs reveals the deeply troubling inconsistencies
in the current patchwork of paternity laws in Maryland.In Stubbs, the CSA looked at the availability of genetic testing
in the context of a request by Kevin Stubbs to establish paternity of a child born while the mother was married to
another man.Forced to decide this issue within the constraints of the sweeping and harsh “genetic testing on
demand” Langston rule, the CSA struggled to avoid allowing the test because of the disruption to an intact family
and harm to the child that would result.Under a strained reading of Maryland’s statutory and case law, the CSA
rejected Stubbs’ request.The court reasoned that, where a request for genetic tests comes from an alleged
biological father seeking to establish paternity of a child of married parents, it is to be evaluated under the Estates
and Trusts Article under a “best interests” analysis. If, on the other hand, the request comes from a legal father
seeking to disestablish paternity, the Paternity Act applies, triggering the Langston automatic testing rule.These
cases leave Maryland’s approach to paternity cases in disarray. The competing interests make resolution of these
issues especially difficult.But the underlying public policy issues are too important for an ad hoc approach.What
public policies are served by laws that protect children of married parents from the destabilizing events triggered by
genetic testing yet allow such testing for children of unmarried mothers, particularly where testing often leaves
these children fatherless?Help may be on its way. The Court of Appeals has recently granted certiorari in a case
examining whether the best interests test applies when resolving requests for genetic testing.Maybe the court will
take this opportunity to develop a more comprehensive and child-focused approach to these issues. Or perhaps a
legislative solution is needed.The General Assembly should take a look at the Uniform Paternity Act of 2002.It
includes a two-year statute of limitations for such requests across the board and makes clear that paternity actions
must consider the best interests of the child. Such an approach would go a long way in addressing the concerns of
all parties while keeping protection of children central to these decisions.
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